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Abstract 
Choice and competition policies in public services are popular reform strategies in the 
member states of the European Union (EU). The European choice agenda is based on the 
view in the EU of ‘social policy as a productive factor’ and the need for ‘modernisation’ of the 
EU welfare states. This user-led, consumer oriented approach highlights the need to 
understand the effects of the choice and competition policies in public service. In 
conventional welfare economic the focus lies on analysis of efficiency, quality and equity 
effects and the current empirical evidence show varying results. This paper discusses choice 
policies in European countries and uses the case of choice in health care in the UK is to assess 
the welfare effects of choice and competition. The UK has a highly developed consumerist 
policy, and as it has served as a role model for other European countries implementing choice 
policies. The welfare effects are assessed using satisfaction with the NHS and subjective well-
being as an indicator of individual welfare, gained from the introduction of choice of hospital 
in 2006. Further the equity aspect of choice is assessed by analysing variation in welfare 
effects between socio economic groups. The results indicate positive effects of choice, 
particularly for middle class individuals.  
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Assessing Welfare Effects of the 
European Choice Agenda: The case of 
health care in the United Kingdom  
 
1. Introduction  
In Europe, policies promoting individual choice in health care, often coupled with 
marketisation and increased competition in various quasi-market solutions, is seen 
both as a way to contain costs and increase efficiency and quality in public services 
(Le Grand 2007). Choice and competition is by an extensive literature argued to 
improve efficiency and quality, whereas political rhetoric promotes choice not only 
as a cost-saving, economically efficient organising principle of public services, but 
also as something intrinsically valuable in any democratic society. Choice policies 
have also been a common feature of most Western European countries, increasingly 
since the 1990’s, but has in later years spread to the eastern European member states. 
The European Union (EU) broadly promotes choice and competition, which are seen 
as the essence of the Single Market project and the same ideas have increasingly been 
applied to the public services agenda. Recently, social policy is discussed as a 
productive factor and has become subject to a ‘modernisation’ agenda, as to which 
competition and user choice are inherent aspects (Huber, Maucher et al. 2008:16). The 
‘Modernisation’ agenda is argued to be driven by, the changing social and economic 
reality of the member states of the EU (CEC 2008). The focus on, and promotion of, 
choice and competition in public services in the EU predicts a further expansion of 
this type of public sector reform, which highlights the need for further assessment 
and understanding choice and competition policies.    
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Following the broad expansion of choice and competition policies in member states 
of the EU, this paper examines the relations between individual welfare and 
increased choice and competition in public services and more particularly in health 
care provision. This question is particularly relevant as to date, the empirical 
evidence of improved efficiency and quality from the introduction of choice and 
competition policies in the health care sector is relatively weak (Propper, Wilson et 
al. 2006; Le Grand 2007b). This provides for an interesting starting point for an 
alternative approach to assessing welfare effects, and corresponds to the critique of 
the conventional outcome oriented approach of welfare economics, limiting our 
understanding of welfare effects (Hahn 1982; Ng 1988). In this paper I argue that the 
use of subjective measures can add to our understanding of welfare effects of choice 
policies. In general terms, extending the analysis beyond the economic outcome 
measures of welfare – commonly analysed through “willingness to pay” revealed 
preferences– is particularly important when analysing the welfare effects of 
procedures such as making a choice.  In regards to the literature on the effects of 
choice policies, the main bulk of contributions concern efficiency or quality effects, 
measured through objective indicators such as length of stay, mortality or morbidity. 
The use of subjective indicators allows for the inclusion of both possible welfare 
effects of choice itself, and effects on service quality (through competition or 
otherwise). Procedural utility generated from the process of choosing (any benefit 
from choice that is not due to improved outcomes) which may also be interpreted as 
the commonly discussed “intrinsic value” of choice.  
The welfare effects are assessed using the case of choice and competition policy in 
health care in the United Kingdom (UK), and more specifically the introduction of 
choice of hospital in England in 2006. The English case was selected due to the scope 
of reform; it has developed from a situation offering very little choice, through a 
gradual expansion of choice and competition elements into a broad quasi-market 
system, and as it is argued to have served as a role model for other European 
countries in reforming their health care policy. Cabiedes and Guillen argue that the 
UK is a country of inspiration for other European countries, partly due to the style of 
reform, including the production of white papers that outline that the broad 
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intentions of policies (2001: 1215). As discussed below, the UK exemplifies a trend in 
health system development common among Beveridgean type health care systems, 
including the Scandinavian countries and Spain, where user choice has continuously 
been extended since the early 1990s. Finally, the case of hospital choice in England 
benefits from the availability of detailed and reliable data which provides an 
opportunity for exploring of the effects of choice on individual welfare.  
The potential effect of choice on equity is also explored, which is particularly 
relevant for the UK case as equity effects of choice policies have been a very much 
debated. I attempt to trace whether any welfare effects of choice is dependent on the 
socio-economic group membership. This examination is intended to provide 
indications in relation to the debate in the UK, both among academic commentators 
and politicians, who present opposing views on the question of who benefits from 
choice policies (Dixon, Grand et al. 2003 ; Dixon and Grand 2006; Barr, Fenton et al. 
2008). Some argue that choice is socially exclusive and that its benefits are mostly felt 
by the middle-classes. Lower socio-economic groups, characterised by lower income 
and level of education, are said to benefit less from increased choice (Dixon and 
Grand 2006). Others argue that previous to the choice policies, only the relatively 
wealthy had choice (of private insurance), and hence with the general choice policy, 
all individuals now benefit from choice (Le Grand 2007b).  
The paper continues with a brief literature review, followed by a discussion about 
choice reform in European countries and the relevance of the UK as a case study. The 
UK policy used for the empirical analysis, choice at referral in the English NHS, is 
then outlined. The empirical analysis is divided into two parts, a first part examining 
the relationship between choice and individual's satisfaction with the NHS followed 
by a second part analysing the effects of higher competitions on individual subjective 
wellbeing (SWB). Section five concludes with a discussion of the results and 
implications for further research.  
 
 
Assessing Welfare Effects of the European Choice Agenda 
 
 
 
4 
2. Understanding Welfare Effects of Choice  
This brief literature review further elaborates the relevance of choice polices in public 
services in the EU, with particular focus on health policies. The meaning of choice 
policies and the implications for the functioning of societies and the view on the state 
and the citizen are discussed. The literature on SWB and how it adds to the 
conventional approach to evaluating welfare policy is followed by brief empirical 
evidence on efficiency and quality in health care. Finally, the aspect of equity in 
access has been heavily debated both in the literature, among politicians and policy 
makers, with strong arguments both in favour of choice being equitable and of choice 
being socially exclusive.  
 
Political economy of choice policies 
Choice policies are much debated in from a political economy point of view as they 
have clear implications for the relationship between individual state and the market.  
Oliver and Evans highlights how the promotion of choice align with the individualist 
view of the society rather than a more communitarist approach (Oliver and Evans 
2005). Here the debate questions the individual’s responsibility for his or her choice 
and the outcomes they produce, and what level of independence from the authorities 
is desirable. The citizen becomes a consumer of public services and even if the 
political science literature views choice as a basic democratic right, choice in public 
services raises the question of how to secure accountability and quality control in a 
quasi-market setting (Newman and Kuhlmann 2007). Burström even argues that the 
choice discourse can be seen as a move away from political accountability to a society 
of consumerist action (2009). The individualisation through choice policies in public 
services are further argued to affect the concept of citizenship as well as dynamics of 
welfare governance (Newman, Glendinning et al. 2008). Newman et al's point has 
implications for the welfare governance also on the European level, where the 
"choice agenda" concerns issues such as effects of cross-border mobility on health 
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care, long-term care and education. Choice policies are changing the way the welfare 
state is understood, on a national level, as well as on a European level.  
 
Understanding and Measuring Welfare  
Theoretically, the economic concepts of welfare and utility have continuously been 
the subject of debate and critique. The standard approach is to measure welfare 
effects in welfare economics is through one of the many versions of cost-benefit 
analysis, using revealed preferences or statements of willingness-to-pay to establish 
how the benefits can be valued. There are two issues with this approach; firstly, it is 
argued that the “willingness-to-pay” estimates are unreliable for public goods such 
as health care services (Costa-Font and Rovira 2005). Secondly, the understanding of 
human behaviour in standard economics is argued to be limited by the assumptions 
of rational preferences theory. In behavioural economics it is argued that utility and 
human behaviour should be approached in a setting of bounded rationality, due to 
imperfect information and cognitive limitations (Thaler 1991) and the possibility that 
individuals are “satisficing” rather than “optimising” when making choices 
(Schwartz, Ward et al. 2002). Further, Margolis questions the idea of individuals 
being governed by self-interest, arguing that there are other values determining 
behaviour, which should be incorporated into economic models (2007).1  
The critique of welfare economics can be met by using subjective measures of 
welfare, and this has been the subject of a blossoming research field referred to as the 
happiness literature.2 One of the core arguments is that subjective measures of well-
being capture individual utility more accurately than the revealed preference 
approach, and that SWB capture the actual motivation for individual behaviour 
(Frijters 2000) Further, Frey, Stutzer and Benz argue that the procedure carries 
                                                        
1 In understanding welfare effects of choice, a vital part is how the choice situation is perceived, 
how many choices were presented, and how well the options fulfilled the patient’s needs.  This 
requires experimental research or data on perceptions of the procedures of presenting choice. 
This is not available within the scope of this paper. Indicative secondary data is discussed in 
below. See Dixon (2007).  
2 For a recent review see Dolan el al. (2008)  
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important implications for individual welfare and should be incorporated into the 
utility concept (Frey and Stutzer 2000; 2002; 2004; Benz 2005). As this paper 
exemplifies, this is particularly relevant when assessing institutionalised processes of 
welfare services such as here; choice policies. The framework of procedural utility was 
initially created by Frey and Stutzer with the purpose to offer a new understanding 
for economic and political questions (2000).  
 
Choice and Welfare Effects 
The practical introduction of choice is generally promoted as an efficiency enhancing 
policy, cutting costs as well as creating incentives for improved quality and 
providing equal access for all. The aspects of efficiency, quality and equity are basic 
building blocks of conventional welfare economic evaluation of welfare effects of a 
policy (Barr 2001). The evidence of the effects of choice policies in public services 
provide varying results, with choice policy deemed to be efficiency and quality 
enhancing under certain conditions such as the correctly incentivising payments 
structures (Le Grand 2007). But regardless of the actual efficiency and quality effects, 
choice is promoted across the disciplines based on the idea that it is an intrinsic 
good- that more choice is positive in its own right (Dowding and John 2009). 
Efficiency effects of choice policies are not likely to directly affect individual welfare. 
However, following the argument of Krutilla the overall efficiency of the system may 
generate indirect effects on welfare, through the existence value of a well-functioning 
health care system (1967). Individuals perceiving that the health system is cost-
efficient, i.e. makes the most of the taxpayers money, can possibly draw welfare from 
this conviction. Apart from the indirect effects on welfare, efficiency arguments are 
not the most important for the analysis of individual welfare.  
Quality improvements instigated by choice policies are argued to be brought about as 
the policy give opportunity to “exit” rather than using “voice” as would be the status 
quo solution (Hirschman 1970). The traditional idea, that patients would influence 
service through complaints, either to the health care provider or responsible officials 
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idea, that is, relying on patient ‘voice’ alone may not be enough to raise quality. 
“Voice” in itself could also be a source of inequity as discussed below. Instead, 
patients should be given the ability to ‘exit’ in order to put pressure on providers to 
raise their performance. However, the nature of the health care market may lead to 
delay of improvements and the “exit” may not be noticed instantly. Propper et al. 
found small yet positive effects of choice on quality, measured as death rates after 
treatment following heart attacks (2004). Similar results were found by Cooper, 
Gibbons et al using AMI mortality as a quality indicator, finding that mortality fell 
more quickly (i.e. quality improved) for patients living in more competitive markets 
after the introduction of hospital competition in the UK, in January 2006. The results 
suggest that hospital competition in markets with fixed prices can lead to 
improvements in clinical quality (2010). In the US, which has a, compared to Europe, 
very privatised and choice oriented health care sector, it has been found that markets 
that are more competitive also bring more quality (Propper, Wilson et al. 2006).  
 
Equity of Choice  
Regardless of the possible negative effects on equity choice has, in the UK, been 
promoted extensively as an equity enhancing policy. This is highlighted in the 
following speech by John Reid, Health Secretary of the Labour government.   
These choices will be there for everybody…not just for a few who 
know their way around the system.  Not just for those who know 
someone ‘in the loop’ – but for everybody with every referral.  That’s 
why our approach to increasing choice and increasing equity go hand 
in hand. We can only improve equity by equalising as far as possible 
the information and capacity to choose (Reid 2003). 
The idea put forward by the UK government was that in the system where the 
“money follows the patient”, patients are enabled to exit and switch providers, and, 
as a result, incentives for providers to treat all patients well, irrespective of a patient’s 
ability to negotiate with their provider, voice their displeasure with their care, or 
somehow manage to game the health care system, are created (Department of Health 
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2003). Further, the UK government and academics associated with the government 
argued that even in systems without formalized choice mechanisms, choice still 
existed for middle and upper classes that have the ability to negotiate with their 
providers for better care or pay to enter the private sector. Creating formalized 
choice mechanisms, they argued, would give every patient the ability to choose 
irrespective of their socioeconomic status (Cooper and Le Grand 2008).  
The effects of choice and quasi-market structures in welfare services on different 
segments of the population has been debated in the literature, questioning whether 
choice policies are as equitable as the politicians often argue. The emphasis on the 
potential of choice to improve care for the traditionally underserved ran contrary to 
the traditional notion that giving patients choice could harm equity (Cooper and 
LeGrand 2008). The government and academics associated with the government 
argued that even in systems without formalized choice mechanisms, choice still 
existed for middle and upper classes that have the ability to negotiate with their 
providers for better care or pay to enter the private sector. By extending choice to the 
whole population these gaps in opportunities for choice of care were intended to be 
closed.  
There may however remain barriers for certain groups of the population, threatening 
equity of access to care; ‘voice’ problems such as communication difficulties, 
language, literacy, assertiveness, articulation, self-confidence and ability to deal with 
professionals, cultural and health beliefs and behaviour, transport difficulties and 
travel distance, as well as the time and financial costs of travel, family or work 
commitments (Dixon, Grand et al. 2003 ; 2006). The outcome may be that poorer 
individuals have longer waiting times because their travel and information costs are 
relatively higher. Dixon et al conclude that there are remaining barriers to access, 
connected with differences between social groups in respect of strength of ‘voice’ and 
in their health beliefs and health seeking behaviour (Dixon, Grand et al. 2003 ). Dixon 
and Le Grand argue that the reasons why extended user choice may not improve 
equity are unequal information, unequal capabilities and unequal flexibility/mobility 
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as well as the differing proportions of income spent, on for  example, travelling costs 
(2006).  
 
3. The consumer choice agenda and European reforms  
Choice and competition policies represent a highly relevant issue across Europe 
particularly as the policies are closely intertwined with the agenda of the EU. 
Consumer choice in public services may not be an outright policy objective of the EU, 
but other EU policies such as the single market and the promotion of cross-border 
mobility indirectly enhance consumer choice in the EU in a noteworthy way. More 
specifically considering choice in health care, the Council Conclusions on Common 
values and principles in European Union Health Systems from 2006 highlighted the 
aim to increase patient participation and choice as well as competition in health care, 
with particular emphasis on the option of receiving health care in another member 
state, known as cross-border mobility. The work towards the goals is by the Council 
argued to contribute to a European choice agenda (2006).  
In practice, choice policies are widespread in European health care systems, albeit 
with clearly disperse reform trajectory depending on underlying model of health 
system. As table 1 illuminates, the health care systems in European countries tend to 
follow two main archetypal trajectories of development with considerably different 
approaches to choice. The Beveridge model is found in the United Kingdom, the 
Scandinavian countries and in Spain, which however was relatively late in 
introducing choice reforms. The health care systems in these countries are denoted 
by a single payer, financed by national taxation, and the use of a National Health 
Service of generally publicly owned hospitals. Access to hospital specialists is 
typically by referral via a general practitioner (GP), and overall limited choice has 
been offered to patients, while relying on GP’s as gatekeepers, guides and 
coordinators of health care. The emphasis however recently been on increasing 
choice of hospital for elective care (Bevan and Van De Ven 2010). Even though 
Sweden introduced choice policies early in the 1990s, the policies have been was later 
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reversed when a social-democratic government came to power (Blomqvist 2004). On 
the other hand, in the Bismarck model countries, exemplified by Germany, France 
and the Netherlands, the reform trajectory is moving in the opposite direction, with 
traditionally free choice being constricted for cost-containment issues.  The model is 
denoted by multiple-insurer financing, employer-based schemes supplemented by 
the state, a mixed public and private provision in which and patients have direct 
access to specialists. Controlling total expenditure has partly been done by reducing 
choice of specialists by types of ‘soft’ gate keeping (Or, Cases et al. 2010). Further, the 
Bismarckian countries have newly introduced choice and competition also in 
financing of health care to alleviate the expenditure problems.  
Table 1:  Overview of health care reform in European countries 
    Reform trajectory 
Expenditure 
% of GDP 
Public 
expenditure, 
% total expenditure 
on health, THE 
Private 
expenditure, 
% total expenditure 
on health, THE 
Private 
insurance,  
% total 
expenditure on 
health, THE 
%  confidence 
in national 
health care 
system 
B
is
m
a
rc
k
ia
n
 t
y
p
e
 h
e
a
lt
h
 c
a
re
 
sy
st
e
m
s 
Belgium 
Traditional choice. Introducing 
competition in 1990s  
11.1 66.8 25.3 4.3 88 
Germany 
Traditional choice. Introducing 
competition in 1990s  
10.5 76.8 23.2 9.2 54 
France Traditional choice. Little competition 11.2 77.8 22.2 13.2 83 
The 
Netherlands 
Traditional choice.  2006 competition 
in financing 
9.9 75.3 16.5 17.7 77 
B
e
v
e
ri
d
g
e
 t
y
p
e
 h
e
a
lt
h
 c
a
re
 
sy
st
e
m
s 
UK 
Choice introduced in 1990s. Choice 
of hospital 2006 
8.7 82.6 17.4 1.4 73 
Denmark  
Choice in 1990s. Choice of hospital 
1992.  
9.7 84.5 15.5 1.6 77 
Spain 
Choice of GP, pilot areas with 
hospital choice (Madrid 2006) 
9.0 72.5 27.5 5.9 77 
Sweden 
Choice in 1990s. Choice of hospital 
1991.  
9.4 81.9 18.1 0.1 79 
(1) All data from 2008, except for Denmark from 2007 
Sources: OECD Health Data 2010 Version: October 2010, and Gallup World Poll (% 
confidence in national health care system) 
 
As the discussion above illustrates, the EU choice agenda is currently very topical in 
the Beveridge model countries, which are continuously are expanding user choice 
and introducing managed competition. In Bismarckian type health care systems the 
issue is less pressing as choice has been a traditional characteristic of health care 
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provision. Analysing choice policy in the UK is particularly valuable in terms of 
lessons for other countries as it is argued to be a role model for Southern European 
countries such as Italy and Spain when debating health care reform (Cabiedes and 
Guilleen 2001). Cabiedes and Guillen argue that the UK became the role model partly 
as a result the policy-making style of producing white papers setting out the 
direction of policy and the overall design. This approach facilitates policy diffusion, 
which is further facilitated by the English language having become a ‘lingua franca’. 
It is further argued that Southern European countries in particular tend to look to 
more advanced EU member states for inspiration rather than other, more similar, 
Southern European countries (2001).  
 
4. Empirical Application: Choice in the English NHS 
The policy here used for the empirical assessment of welfare effects is the choice of 
hospital reform in the English National Health Service (NHS), introduced in 2006. 
The policy was introduced as part of the wave of market-based reforms to the NHS 
enacted by the Labour party from 2003 to 2008. The reforms focused on increasing 
patient choice and hospital competition and were accompanied by significant 
institutional changes to support a market for hospital care for NHS-funded patients. 
The purpose of the reforms was to improve quality whilst containing costs and to 
provide equitable care to all. On January 1, 2006, every patient in England became 
eligible to choose their secondary care3 provider as well as where they receive 
surgical care. Along with giving patients a formal choice of where they could receive 
secondary care, the government also introduced a new information system, known 
as ‘Choose and Book’, which enabled paperless referrals and appointment bookings 
and which provided information on quality to help patients make more informed 
choices (Department of Health 2009). The booking interface gives the person booking 
the appointment the ability to search for hospitals based on geographic distance.  It 
                                                        
3 Excluded patient groups are those in need of emergency and urgent services, patients with 
cancer, maternity care and mental health services.  
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also allows them to see estimates of each hospital’s waiting times based on their last 
20 appointments. The difference in systems between the countries of the UK as 
outlined provides for an interesting natural experiment in assessing the effects of the 
different structures of health care provision.  
The empirical modelling to assess the welfare effects of choice is divided into two 
parts, both concerning the Choice at referral policy introduced into the English NHS 
in 2006. The first part is concerned with the satisfaction with the NHS as an 
institution and how choice affects the self-reported satisfaction with the NHS. The 
regressions and descriptive statistics provide an understanding of the effects of 
choice but also the underlying dynamics of why and how people choose. Further 
analysis in this respect would be useful but not within the scope of this paper. The 
first part utilises the British Social Attitudes survey from 2007. The second part 
assesses the effects of choice on individual welfare, measured as life satisfaction. 
Choice in this part is instrumented through a measure of competition in the local 
area. The second part uses the British Household Panel Survey, also from 2007.  
 
4.1 Choice and satisfaction with the NHS  
The purpose of this section is to explore the views on choice in the English NHS, 
after the introduction of the choice of hospital policy (1st January 2006) by utilising 
the British Social Attitudes survey from September 20074 (see appendix I for further 
details).  
 
 
 
 
                                                        
4 It would have been beneficial to include further waves of data (2008 and onwards) but due to 
the extensive changes in the economic climate of 2008, which is not unlikely to influence the 
subjective evaluations of public services, this study primarily focuses on data from 2007.  
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Figure 1: Factors mentioned when as determining when choosing hospital 
 
Source: National Patient Choice Survey 2007 
Interestingly, and to a certain extent against the assumptions of the literature on 
choice, the highest rated consideration is the location of the hospital. 65% of 
individuals mentioned location and transport possibilities as a consideration when 
choosing a hospital. The literature concluding that choice should generate quality 
improvements depends on patients “voting with their feet” and avoiding, or telling 
others to avoid, hospitals with perceived poor quality. Reputation of hospital is 
mentioned as a consideration by 20% of patients in the survey, but whether this 
implies an effect on hospitals is questionable. Marshall et al. for instance, question 
how much individuals take hospital ratings into account when choosing a hospital  
(2000). 
As discussed above, procedural utility is argued to arise from procedures perceived 
as positive by the individual. NHS patients overall are rather satisfied  with the 
procedure of choosing, where 79% in the National Patient Choice Survey claims to be 
“very satisfied” or “fairly satisfied” with the process of choosing. In this paper the 
procedural value of choice is an inherent part of the analysis, albeit difficult to 
distinguish whether welfare improvements stem from changes in outcome or 
changed in the procedure. Identifying procedural utility from choice poses 
considerable methodological challenges, but is clearly an interesting point.  
Assessing Welfare Effects of the European Choice Agenda 
 
 
 
14 
Awareness of the policy and possible distortions in who actually gets offered a 
choice by the GP is a possible distortion to the exploration of the data. The 
implementation of the choice policy seem to be slow, as by 2007, 45% of the sample 
in the National Patient Choice Survey can recall that they had been offered a choice 
by their GP when being referred for elective surgery. Noteworthy is that 39% state 
that they were aware of the choice before seeing the GP. Hence the introduction of 
the choice policy is clearly challenged by an information deficiency which clearly 
will affect the results in this first part of the analysis. Noteworthy is that the analysis 
here is driven by perceptions and not necessarily by facts. Unfortunately it is in the 
current data not possible to identify who was offered a choice and who was not.  The 
regression analysis has the goal of assess the welfare effects of having choice of 
various aspects to the interaction with the NHS. First I discuss the dependent 
variables before outlining the model and discussing the results.  
 
Dependent variable 
The dependent variable is satisfaction with the NHS, the question being posed “How 
satisfied you are with how nhs runs nowadays?” with answers ranging from “very 
satisfied” to “very dissatisfied” (on a 1-5 scale).5 The “NHS satisfaction” variable 
corresponds to what the happiness literature refers to as a variable of domain 
satisfaction (Ferrer-i-Carbonell 2002). Common examples of this type of survey 
question are; satisfaction with accommodation and job satisfaction, and they provide 
a measure of the individual satisfaction (i.e. well-being) generated from the relevant 
domain. Hence, the measure “satisfaction with the NHS” can be understood as the 
wellbeing an individual draws from the NHS as an institution. The domain 
satisfaction can be contrasted with global measures of subjective wellbeing, such as 
happiness or life satisfaction, which tend to be less clearly related to narrow policy 
issues. As we shall see in section 4.2 life satisfaction is affected by level of 
                                                        
5 In the BSA “very satisfied” is coded as “1” on the scale of 1-5. For the purpose of this analysis I 
have recoded “very satisfied” as 5 and less satisfaction corresponds with a lower number.  
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competition. Using domain satisfaction circumvents the common critique of 
happiness or life satisfaction being too broad measures (Ferrer-i-Carbonell 2002).  
Table 2 Satisfaction with the NHS and views on choice, per cent. 
How satisfied are you with NHS?
2004 2007
very satisfied 7.72 10.88
quite satisfied 36.67 40.68
neither satisfied nor dissatisfied 19.04 18.39
quite dissatisfied 22.51 20.21
very dissatisfied 13.75 9.32
don't know 0.28 0.52
NHS patient should have hospital choice?
2004 2007
a great deal 21.82 30.73
quite a lot 41.11 45.29
a little 27.23 19.36
none at all 8.85 3.96
don't know 0.94 0.65
Nr of observations 4,124  
 
Source: British Social Attitudes survey 2004 and 2007.  
 
Noteworthy is that satisfaction with the NHS, as well as the preferences for more 
choice, seem to have increased from before the introduction of the choice of hospital 
policy in 2006 as indicated in table 2. This speaks in favour of positive effects of 
choice policy; however more careful analysis is necessary.6 In order to more closely 
trace the relationship between choice and satisfaction I estimate an ordered probit 
regression, to account for the categorical nature of the dependent variable, according 
to the following equation:  
iiiisat XCNHS εββα +++= 21  
Where satisfaction with the NHS is regressed on a set of demographic covariates iX , 
and various combinations of choice indicators iC . The coefficients of an ordered 
                                                        
6 Regrettably it has, due to lack of appropriate data  not yet  been possible to establish a causal 
relationship between choice and satisfaction by tracing the development over time and across 
groups with more or less choice.  
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probit model cannot be directly interpreted; only the sign and significance is relevant 
in the tables below.7 
In table 3, the results of the ordered probit are reported on a sample of all English 
individuals, regardless of whether they have been in the hospital and in effect been 
subject to the policy. This group may still benefit from the policy through what 
Krutilla discusses as an existence value. It implies that the welfare effect should be 
stronger for individuals who have been directly subject to the policy but it is also 
likely that the policy indirectly affects other individuals, regardless of whether they 
have been subject to the choice policy, through the experiences of family and friends 
(1967).  
The results show an interesting relation between individual's desired level of choice, 
and how much choice they feel that they get in the NHS. A higher level of desired 
choice corresponds to a lower level of satisfaction with the NHS. Further, a higher 
level of perceived choice is associated with a higher level of satisfaction with the 
NHS. The signs are robust to changes in the specification; the table shows one 
example where only the "desired level of choice" variable is entered in specification I. 
The same relationship applies to the level of choice of treatment desired, and the 
corresponding perceived amount of choice available. When both sets of variables are 
entered jointly, only the desired level of choice of hospital is no longer significant, 
and all signs remain the same.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
7 In order to generate relevant coefficients, marginal effects of each category of the dependent 
variable must be calculated. For the illustrative purposes of this paper the sign and significance 
provides sufficient information. Marginal effects tables are available from the author.    
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Table 3: Views on choice and the effects on satisfaction with the NHS. BSA 2007. 
Sample: all English individuals.  
Dependent variable: satisfaction with the NHS 
    I II III IV 
How much choice of hospital: 
    Desired?  -0.0864* -0.1316*** 
 
-0.0677 
Actually have?  
 
0.2845*** 
 
0.1982*** 
How much choice of treatment:  
   Desired?  
  
-0.1763*** -0.1493** 
Actually have?  
  
0.3037*** 0.2001*** 
Demographic covariates Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Household income -0.0224** -0.0210* -0.0188* -0.0181* 
Education level  0.1437 0.1005 0.0834 0.0659 
  cut 1 _cons -0.5012 -0.2406 -0.171 -0.2521 
 
cut2 _cons 0.3599 0.6391* 0.7092* 0.6351 
 
cut3 _cons 0.8633** 1.1470*** 1.2228*** 1.1529*** 
  cut4 _cons 2.2405*** 2.5376*** 2.6289*** 2.5673*** 
  Observations 811 788 786 774 
  R-square (pseudo) 0.0174 0.0278 0.0278 0.0325 
 
*** 1%, ** 5%, * 10% significance level.                          Source: British Social Attitudes survey 2007. 
 
Interestingly, when considering individuals who have actually been hospitalised or 
had a close family member in hospital, all signs stay the same, but it is now only the 
variables denoting who much choice the individual perceives to have that are 
significant. This may indicate less negative effects of having a preference for a high 
level of choice of hospital, when having a recent experience of hospitalisation. 
Clearly, this is not a causal relationship, but the results may point towards a positive 
effect of the choice of hospital policy. Individuals in this narrow sample do not 
display a negative relationship between satisfaction with the NHS and the desired 
level of choice of hospital.  
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Table 4: Views on choice and the effects on satisfaction with the NHS. BSA 2007.  
Sample: individuals who have been in hospital after June 2006 .   
Dependent variable: Satisfaction with NHS  
    I II III IV 
How much choice of hospital: 
    Desired?  0.0513 0.0224 0.0704 
Actually have?  0.2336** 0.1429 
How much choice of treatment:  
   Desired?  -0.1033 -0.1674* 
Actually have?  0.3399*** 0.2638** 
Demographic covariates Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Household income -0.0083 -0.0078 -0.0132 -0.0096 
Education level  0.0106 0.0015 0.0095 0.0106 
  cut 1 _cons 0.2914 0.4391 0.3314 0.3349 
 
cut2 _cons 1.0853* 1.2312** 1.1292* 1.1308* 
 
cut3 _cons 1.5460*** 1.6981*** 1.5961*** 1.6058*** 
  cut4 _cons 2.9139*** 3.0868*** 3.0142*** 3.0323*** 
  Observations 305 299 299 295 
  R-square (pseudo) 0.0186 0.0256 0.0292 0.0315 
 
 
*** 1%, ** 5%, * 10% significance level.                          Source: British Social Attitudes survey 2007. 
 
Overall the models have a low explanatory power, which is to be expected from this 
type of regression on a subjective variable. As discussed below, individual 
unobservables determine a large part of the variance in this kind of satisfaction 
measures. What this examination of the data on choice preferences in relation to the 
NHS indicates is that choice seems to matter for individual satisfaction, and that 
people increasingly welcome choice in health care.  
 
4.2 Competition and Welfare 
This section investigates whether a higher number of hospitals within the local 
authority, indicating both that the individual has a larger “feasible” choice set, and 
that the hospitals are subject to more competition and possibly better quality, have 
an effect on individual wellbeing. This analysis is makes use of British Household 
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Panel Survey data from 2007 and a measure of the intensity of competition the 
hospitals within each local authority area faces.  
The Dependent variable is in this part is self-reported life satisfaction. The data was 
collected for the BHPS through the question “How dissatisfied or satisfied are you with 
your life overall?” using a seven point scale where one equals “not satisfied at all” and 
seven “completely satisfied”.8  
The policy variable is here a measure of differences in provision, a large or smaller 
feasible choice set, measured as the level of competition within each local authority 
in England, captures welfare effects of the character of choice. The feasible choice set 
is measured through an competition index created by Cooper and Gibbons (2010) 
that defines market areas based on a variable radius derived from patient flows from 
GPs to hospitals. The index captures differences in market concentration and 
increases with competition, zero corresponding to monopoly and one to perfect 
competition. A higher number of hospitals in a travelable proximity provide a larger 
choice set for the individual. The index available is a measure of competition per 
hospital site (based on the level of competition within a fixed radius area) which has 
been matched onto the BHPS and aggregated to local authority level (see appendix 
for details on the competition measure and matching procedure).  
The regressions are estimated in accordance with the following equation:  
ittijit XnlhhiSWB εββα +++= 21     (1)  
Where jnlhhi  represents the competition index by Cooper et al (2010), ranging from 
0-1 where 1 equals perfect competition and 0 monopoly (see appendix for further 
discussion on the calibration of the measure).  
tiX is a vector of demographic determinants of SWB: sex, age, marital status, 
employment status, income, level of education, household size, health variables. Varieties of 
further controls are introduced in the individual models.  
                                                        
8 This section has been replicated on the BSA survey used in the previous section, however with 
insignificant results.  
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The models are estimated under the assumption that the SWB measure is cardinal9, 
and hence the SWB can be estimated as a continuous variable rather than a 
categorical variable. The cardinality assumption is common in psychological 
research, whereas in economics it is common to only assume ordinality. Ferrer-i-
Carbonell and Frijters tested the different approaches finding that the cardinal versus 
ordinal assumption makes no real difference (2004). All regressions have been run 
using OLS, ordered probit and ordered logit. As the results proved consistent the 
OLS regression are shown, as the coefficients of an OLS are more convenient to 
interpret and ordered regressions require further calculations to interpret the 
marginal effects of the coefficients.10  
Firstly, table 5 shows a set of regression specifications of common demographic and 
socio-economic covariates of life satisfaction, by now well-known from the happiness 
literature, and how these interact with the competition measure. The competition 
index is consistently positive and significant, but becomes insignificant (just above 
the 10% level) when income is subtracted from the regression. We know from the 
literature that income is a strong determinant of life satisfaction, and in this 
incompletely specified regression the effect of income slightly outweighs the effect of 
the competition index. This problem disappears when introducing further controls in 
the specifications below.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
9 Meaning that the difference between 2 and 3 is the same as between 6 and 7 and hence it is 
possible to say that an individual with a score of 4 is twice as satisfied as an individual with 2.     
10 Regression tables of all regression varieties are available upon request from the author. 
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Table 5: Covariate regressions, analysing the interactions between demographic 
control variables, income and the competition index. Dependent variable: Life 
satisfaction 
Regression 
specification 
I II III IV V VI VII 
Competition index 0.345* 0.3613* 0.3317* 0.3570* 0.3461* 0.3717* 0.318 
male -0.234 -0.2486* -0.2893* -0.220 -0.247 -0.244 
Age 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Household size -0.2310*** -0.2252*** -0.1083* -0.2443*** 
-
0.2358*** -0.1559** 
Number of children 0.328*** 0.3100*** 0.1334** 0.3236*** 0.3173*** 0.2473*** 
Education level  -0.156 -0.158 -0.247 -0.182 -0.154 -0.240 
Unemployed -0.8920** -0.8418** -0.9571*** -0.9285**   -0.8251** 
-
1.0456*** 
Household income 0.0001*** 0.0001*** 0.0001* 0.0001** 0.0001*** 0.0001*** 
Constant 4.9505*** 4.9975*** 4.5818*** 5.0463*** 4.9774*** 4.9636*** 5.2603*** 
Observations 402 402 402 402 418 402 402 
R-square (adjusted) 0.0556 0.0616 0.0361 0.0381 0.0602 0.054 0.044 
*** 1%, ** 5%, * 10% significance level.                                     Source: BHPS for 2007, all individuals   
 
To examine the relationship between the competition index and life satisfaction I run 
four specifications throughout this section, with the main sample being English 
individuals who had been in hospital after 1st of September 2006, and a set of 
subsamples; consisting of various calibrations of social groups. The results are shown 
in tables 6-, and all tables include a standard regression with common covariates of 
life satisfaction, and various sets of control variables. We see that when introducing 
health status into the equations the r-square increases considerably (table with full 
coefficients is available in appendix). A higher self-rated health status is strongly 
positive and significant whereas being disabled is strongly negative, and again 
significant. The importance of health variables for the individual life satisfaction 
highlights the likelihood that differences in health care would influence SWB (the 
measure of welfare).  
The overall explanatory power of the models, the r-square, ranges between 0.05 and 
0.20 which is coherent with what is to be expected from SWB models. Full models 
with observable covariates of SWB explain between 8 and 20% of the variation, the 
rest is explained by unobservable variables such as personality traits and individual 
conditions influencing the SWB rating.  
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Table 6: Competition index OLS analysis. Sample: English individuals who had 
been in hospital after 1st September 2006. BHPS 2007.  
Dependent variable “life satisfaction” (scale 1-7) 
 
Regression 
specifications I II III IV 
Competition index 0.3676* 0.3622** 0.6275*** 0.5783*** 
Demographic 
covariates 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Income Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Health covariates No Yes No Yes 
Local authority 
characteristics (LA) 
No No Yes Yes 
Implementation 
rate in LA 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 3.8730*** 2.5523*** 3.1814*** 2.0377*** 
Observations 401 401 401 401 
R-square (adjusted) 0.124 0.201 0.134 0.208 
*** 1%, ** 5%, * 10% significance level.                                     Source: BHPS for 2007, all individuals   
 
In table 6 the competition index is positive and significant throughout, controlling for 
demographic covariates, individual income, health covariates (health status and 
disability), local authority (LA) characteristics (average house price, unemployment 
rate), and implementation rate in the LA (what percentage can recall being offered a 
choice of hospital by GP). The results indicate a positive effect of a larger feasible 
choice set, and a higher competition between hospitals for individual wellbeing.  
More choice and competition seem to be positive overall, however, on this follows 
the question of whether the results are consistent for all social groups as has been 
strongly argued as discussed above. In brief, the debate concerns issues such as the 
fact that prior to the introduction of the broad choice in health care policies of the 
2000s, income was a strong determinant of the availability of choice, with only the 
relatively wealthy in a position to choose private care. The introduction of broad 
choice policies has therefore been described as equitable since they extend choice to 
all income groups. This may imply that lower income groups should gain relatively 
more well-being from the option to choose than higher income groups who already 
had a degree of choice.  Level of education, meanwhile, is argued to play an 
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important role in the propensity to use and appreciate choice in health care as 
individuals with higher education are more likely to be IT literate, better able to 
grasp the presented choice set, more capable of making informed choices and more 
confident in their discussions with doctors (Dixon, Grand et al. 2003 ). Hence it is 
likely that individuals with a higher level of education will enjoy relatively more 
well-being from being offered a choice of hospital.  
Here the welfare effects of choice on various social groups are based on a selection of 
groups identified with the purpose of assessing the equity effects of choice. There are 
several imputed social group variables available in the BHPS such as Goldthorpe's 
class schema, but the pre-calibrated variables imputed from other questions in the 
BHPS have the problematic drawback of reducing the sample size beyond feasibility 
for the regressions. This is also the reason for using only individual indicators such 
as income and education, rather than creating composite indicators of social groups. I 
use individual indicators to replicated the following groups: firstly, the “middle 
class” group that has been argued to be the target group of choice policies though 
“middle class electoral politics, identified through "above median income", "high 
education" and "skilled worker". According to this literature, the middle class group 
benefits most from choice policies and in health care this is argued to be a result of 
superior capabilities to make optimal use of the choice offered. The “working class” 
group is argued to be less able to make use and benefit from the policy, due to lower 
level of education and funds to travel to other hospitals than the local, here analysed 
as "below median income", "low education" and  "unskilled workers".  
The results are reported in table 7, and in order to avoid collinearity the demographic 
control variables, income and health controls have been removed. These are strongly 
correlated with social group, for example poor health is highly overrepresented in 
lower social groups (the regression have also been run with the controls included, an 
example can be found in table 8). The effect of competition is only positive and 
significant for individuals with above median income and high education whereas 
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the sub-samples of below median income earners, low education, skilled and low-
skilled workers are all insignificant.11 
Table 7: Competition index, OLS analysis of English individuals who were in 
hospital after April 2006, data from year 2007, by socio-economic characteristics  
Dependent variable “life satisfaction” (scale 1-7) 
Social group
12 
Below median 
income 
Above median 
income 
High 
education 
Low 
education 
Skilled 
worker 
Low-skilled 
worker 
Competition 
index 
0.2265 0.5337** 0.7172** 0.2045 0.2419 0.274 
Demografic 
covariates No No No No No No 
Income No No No No No No 
Health covariates No No No No No No 
Local authority 
characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Implementation 
rate in LA Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 4.0192*** 4.1662*** 3.4339*** 4.5634*** 4.2852*** 5.8651***  
Observations 205 245 162 288 142 73 
R-square (adj) 0.1478 0.2327 0.0158 -0.0108 -0.005 0.0487 
*** 1%, ** 5%, * 10% significance level.                        Source: BHPS for 2007, individuals in hospital  
 
As discussed above, choice is often argued to be a “middle class policy” primarily 
benefiting the more affluent and of higher education, and the results in table 7 is 
consistent with this argument. Individuals with higher than median income, and 
individuals with high education (defined as further education beyond a-levels, see 
appendix for data and variable specification) are the only groups that are 
significantly benefited by higher competition, and hence more choice in their local 
authority. Table 8 illustrates the robustness of the results for these groups when 
adding demographic covariates, health variables and household income.  
 
 
                                                        
11 Some of the specifications have negative r-square which is explained by overall 
misspecification. They are only included for illustrative purposes, and the results are consistent 
when, if possible due to sample size, extending the specification with further controls.  
12 Further indicators that represent an insufficient sample size in the BHPS data was private 
health insurance  
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Table 8: Competition index, OLS analysis of English individuals who were in 
hospital after April 2006, data from year 2007, sub-samples "middle class" 
income and education 
  
Above 
median 
income 
High 
education 
Above 
median 
income 
High 
education 
Above 
median 
income 
High 
education 
Above 
median 
income 
High 
education 
Competition 
index 
0.7642*** 0.8695*** 0.6143** 0.5973* 0.4417* 0.5873* 0.5337** 0.7172** 
Demografic 
covariates 
Yes Yes No No No No No No 
Income Yes Yes Yes Yes No No No No 
Health 
covariates 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No No 
Local authority 
characteristics 
(LA) 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Implementation 
rate in LA 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 3.0107*** 1.7875 3.1217*** 2.5017*** 3.1217*** 2.5017*** 4.1662*** 3.4339*** 
Observations 202 162 212 162 205 245 245 162 
R-square (adj) 0.303 0.237 0.1866 0.1475 0.1744 0.1511 0.2327 0.0158 
*** 1%, ** 5%, * 10% significance level.                        Source: BHPS for 2007, individuals in hospital  
 
The effect for individuals with above median income, 0.76 (full specification), and for 
highly educated individuals, 0.87, is considerably higher than the coefficient of 0.57 
for the whole sample. This implies that the two sub-groups gain 20-30% more than 
the average individual and the results are consistent with the argument that choice 
policies are not primarily equitable as they benefit the already well off more. This 
may be due to higher level of education, and more capability to make use of the 
choice in a way that generates welfare. This speaks in favour of the argument in the 
literature that an important aspect of choice policies is to understand the capability 
on the part of the individual to actually make the choice.  
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5. Conclusions 
The analysis above has provided insights into the welfare effects of choice policies in 
health care. The use of subjective indicators allowed for the identification of welfare 
effects, and is here argued to provide a more accurate account of individual welfare 
compared to the standard approach in welfare economics. The analysis considered 
satisfaction with the NHS and life satisfaction as subjective indicators of the welfare 
derived from interaction with the health services.  
The results show an interesting relation between individual's desired level of choice, 
and how much choice they feel that they get in the NHS. A higher level of desired 
choice corresponds to a lower level of satisfaction with the NHS. Further, a higher 
level of perceived choice is associated with a higher level of satisfaction with the 
NHS. Interestingly, when considering individuals who have actually been 
hospitalised or had a close family member in hospital, but the results point towards a 
positive effect of the choice of hospital policy. Individuals in this narrow sample do 
not display a negative relationship between satisfaction with the NHS and the 
desired level of choice of hospital. The examination of the data on choice preferences 
in relation to the NHS indicates is that choice seem to matter for individual 
satisfaction, and that people increasingly welcome choice in health care 
Further, the effect of competition on life satisfaction is positive overall, which 
indicates the more choice and competition improves welfare. However, this effect 
only holds for what is here defined as "middle class" individuals with a good income 
and high education. Hence, the argument that the “new” choice policies in health 
care are equitable is not supported by the present analysis. Rather, the results point 
towards the often made argument that choice is a middle class policy, mainly 
benefiting well educated, high income individuals who are able to make optimal use 
of the available choice.  
The overall positive effects of choice indicated by the results of the empirical analysis 
has implications for the choice agenda of the EU, which has received critique for 
being overly neo-liberal and detrimental to the status of European welfare states. The 
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results indicate positive welfare effects, which is likely to be applicable to other 
countries carrying out similar policies. However, when discussing the equity issue 
the results are less transferable due to the highly diverse social structures in other 
European countries carrying out choice policies.  
The positive effect for the middle class is particularly interesting in the political 
context of the UK, where the political system is highly polarised and the middle class 
is a strong and important electorate. Noteworthy is that both Labour and the 
Conservative party has emphasised the choice policies over time, which corresponds 
to the idea that choice is a middle class issue. However, the policy has very much 
been presented as an equitable policy, and the results of this paper questions the 
validity of the claims in practice. Potentially the results will change over time as the 
perception of choice as an institution for all individuals, regardless of social group 
may be established.  
The results presented in this paper suggest a number of new directions for further 
research. Based on the “feasible choice-set” analysis at the provision level it would be 
possible to further investigate the possibilities to identify an optimal size of the 
choice set as well as effects of character of the choice provided. Such an analysis 
would test key arguments about social choice; that is, that it matters what kind of 
choice is presented, not simply more choice, but it may be welfare enhancing with 
fewer options but more diverse (Dowding John 2009). The same applies to the 
arguments of the libertarian paternalists that how much choice matters and that too 
much choice may be counterproductive. It has also been argued that it may be 
welfare enhancing to offer default options (Thaler and Sunstein 2003). Furthermore, 
assessing welfare effects on other choice policies such as choice of education and 
choice in long-term care would provide further insights.  
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Appendix  
Full table 3: Views on choice and the effects on satisfaction with the NHS. BSA 
2007. Sample: all English individuals.  
Dependent variable: satisfaction with the NHS 
 
I II III IV 
Female 0.0232 0.0106 0.0329 0.0193 
Age 0.0080** 0.0063 0.0075** 0.0059 
Health status 0.1497*** 0.1309*** 0.1381*** 0.1291*** 
married/living as 
married 0.0973 0.0453 0.0757 0.0175 
widowed 0.0208 0.0318 -0.0035 -0.0294 
never married 0.0773 0.0495 0.0898 0.0359 
Household income -0.0224** -0.0210* -0.0188* -0.0181* 
Education level  0.1437 0.1005 0.0834 0.0659 
in work, waiting to take 
up work 0.1995 0.2593 0.2591 0.2882 
unemployed 0.3061 0.3514 0.4378 0.443 
retired 0.325 0.3978 0.3817 0.4521 
-0.0864* -0.1316*** -0.0677 
How much choice of 
hospital should have?  0.2845*** 0.1982*** 
How much choice have?  -0.1763*** -0.1493** 
How much choice of 
treatment should have?  0.3037*** 0.2001*** 
How much choice have?  0.3531*** 
cut 1 _cons -0.5012 -0.2406 -0.171 -0.2521 
cut2 _cons 0.3599 0.6391* 0.7092* 0.6351 
cut3 _cons 0.8633** 1.1470*** 1.2228*** 1.1529*** 
cut4 _cons 2.2405*** 2.5376*** 2.6289*** 2.5673*** 
Observations 811 788 786 774 
R-square (pseudo) 0.0174 0.0278 0.0278 0.0325 
____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
*** 1%, ** 5%, * 10% significance level.                         
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Description of data 
- British Household Panel Survey (BHPS). The BHPS covers the years 1991–
2007 and follows and interviews adults (aged 16 and above) from a sample of 
about 5,500 households, collecting information about their incomes, labour 
market status, housing tenure and conditions, household composition, 
education, health and many other aspects of people’s lives.  
- British Social Attitudes Survey 2007. (Dixon 2008)  
Fieldwork between 15th June and 24th November 2007.  
Observations: England 2430  
- National Patient Choice Survey conducted by Ipsos MORI on behalf of the 
Department of Health, July 2007 England. Fieldwork 16 to 29 July 2007. 62,264 
Observations.  
 
Item Variable Question/definition Data (variable) 
Choice 
variables 
from BSA 
How much choice of 
hospital desired?  
How much choice nhs patients should have about which hospital for 
treatment?  
British Social 
Attitudes 
survey 
(chohosp) 
How much choice 
actually have?  How much choice nhs patients do  have about which hospital for treatment?  
British Social 
Attitudes 
survey 
(chohosp2) 
How much choice of 
treatment desired?  How much choice nhs patients should have about kinds of treatment?  
British Social 
Attitudes 
survey 
(chotreat) 
How much choice 
actually have?  How much choice nhs patients actually  have about kinds of treatment?  
British Social 
Attitudes 
survey 
(chotrea2) 
LA level 
controls for 
competition 
index 
regressions 
Local authority 
characteristics (LA) 
Average housing cost (average price of all sold poroperties 
during 2007) 
Unemployment 
rate (Average 
unemployment 
rate per LA in 
2007) 
 (ONS 
neighbourhood 
statistics)  
Implementation rate 
in LA 
National Patient Choice Survey, % of indivudals recalling having been offered 
a choice by GP.    
Social 
group 
indicators 
High education  higher degree, first degree, teaching qf, other higher qf   BHPS (qfedhi) 
Low education gce a levels, gce o levels or eq, commercial qf, no o levels, cse grade 2-5, scot 
grade 4-5, apprenticeship, other qf, no qf BHPS (qfedhi) 
Skilled worker 
professional occ, managerial & technical occ,  skilled non-
manual     BHPS (jbrgsc) 
Low-skilled worker 
Skilled manual, partly skilled occ, unskilled occ, armed 
forces   BHPS (jbrgsc) 
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Hospital competition index  
Within this market area, to measure the degree of market concentration, the negative 
natural logarithm of an HHI (Hirschman-Herfindahl index of market concentration) 
based on hospitals’ patient shares. This negative log transformation of the HHI is 
convenient because it increases with competition, with zero corresponding to 
monopoly and infinity to perfect competition.  For given market area j, the 
competition index is given by:  
 
nlhhi j = − ln
nk
N j






2
k =1
N
∑
 
Here, nk is the number of procedures carried out at hospital site k within market area 
j and Nj is the total number of procedures carried out in market area j. 
 
Matching of hospital competition index and BHPS by local authority 
The hospital competition index is a number between 0 and 1 for each hospital. As 
lowest geographical aggregation in the BHPS is local authority code, the competition 
index had to be aggregated by local authority area. In … of the cases there was more 
than one hospital per local authority and in those cases the average value of the 
individual competition index for each hospital was calculated.  In most of the cases 
with more than one hospital the competition index was very close between the 
present hospitals, but in a small number of cases the difference was considerable. In 
these cases an individual judgement was made of the size of the local authority and 
the localisation of the hospitals to assess the appropriate competition level for the 
local authority. The index for each local authority was then merged onto the BHPS so 
that each individual was assigned a value for the local authority of residence.  
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